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Abstract
In this paper we present a new class of values for cooperative games with level struc-
ture. We use a multi-step proceeding, suggested first in Owen (1977), applied to the
weighted Shapley values. Our first axiomatization is an extension of the axiomatization
given in Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) respectively by efficiency and
weighted balanced contributions. The second axiomatization extends the axiomatization
of the weighted Shapley values by weighted standardness for two player games and con-
sistency, also introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). As a corollary we obtain a new
axiomatization of the Shapley levels value.
Keywords Game theory · Cooperative game · Consistency · Level structure ·
(Weighted) Shapley (levels) value · Weighted balanced contributions
1 Introduction
Presenting his famous value for coalition structures, Owen (1977) suggested an extension
of his value that
”... deals with union structure hierarchies, i. e., the possibility that, inside each
union, there may be some groups who are closer together then the remaining
members of the union. For example, some of the union members may belong
to a certain clan, and will therefore make a common front against the other
union members.”
Winter (1989) was the first one who putted this idea into action by constructing a model
for hierarchical structures, called level structure. Then he defined his value, we call it
Shapley levels value, by a set of axioms, which are extensions of axioms of an axioma-
tization of the Owen value (Owen, 1977) and so finally of the Shapley value (Shapley,
1953b). Another axiomatization of the Shapley levels value is presented in Calvo, Lasaga
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2and Winter (1996, Theorem 2). They extended the axiomatization of the Shapley value in
Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) respectively by efficiency and balanced
contributions to level structures to axiomatize the Shapley levels value.
With this in mind, Vidal-Puga (2012) defined initially a weighted value for coalition
structures and Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) extended it to level structures. Their
value is an extension of a special case of the weighted Shapley values (Shapley, 1953a).
They axiomatized this value by efficiency and an adaption of a particular case of weighted
balanced contributions, called balanced per capita contributions, in the end an adaption
of a special case of an axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values, also presented in
Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). By this value, all coalitions have been
assigned weights given by the cardinality of the coalitions. In difference to the Shapley
levels value, if we regard games where some coalitions are the players such acting coalitions
are only be treated as symmetric if they are symmetric in these games and contain the
same amount of players in the original game.
But sometimes this approach is not adequate, e.g. if some coalitions have a lack of
ability to perform or not the same political power and so on. To be no longer restricted to
that limitation we introduce arbitrary exogenously given weights for the coalitions which
become prominent if the coalitions act as players. So we can introduce the weighted
Shapley hierarchy levels values. It turned out, by defining weights of coalitions appro-
priately, the axiomatization of the value from Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) can be
easily transferred to an axiomatization given by efficiency and weighted balanced group
contributions, a general extension of weighted balanced contributions in Myerson (1980).
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) presented another axiomatization of the weighted Shapley
values. They used the weighted standardness property, that means that in a two player
game the cooperation benefit has to be divided proportionally to the weights of the players,
and a consistency property. Consistency requires the payout to a player in a reduced game
be the same as the payoff to this player in the original game if the reduced game is defined
suitably. As main part of the paper, we extend this axiomatization to level structures to
characterize the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Some preliminaries are given in section 2, in section 3
are introduced the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values and an axiomatization in the
sense of Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, Theorem 2), section 4 presents a new consistency
property with an related axiomatization and section 5 gives a short conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
In some definitions and notations we will follow with Besner (2018a). Let R be the real
numbers, R++ the set of all positive real numbers, U a countably infinite set, the universe
of all possible players, and N the set of all finite subsets N ⊆ U, N 6= ∅. A TU-game
is a pair (N, v) with a player set N ∈ N and a coalition function v : 2N→ R, v(∅) =
0, 2N:= {S : S ⊆ N}. We call v(S) the worth of coalition S ⊆ N , we denote by ΩS the
set of all nonempty subsets of S and the set of all TU-games with player set N is denoted
by VN. (S, v) is the restriction of (N, v) to S ∈ ΩN and a player i ∈ N is called a null
player in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S), S ⊆ N\{i}.
B := {B1, ..., Bm} is said to be a coalition structure on N if Bk∩B` = ∅, 1 ≤ k < ` ≤
3m, Bk 6= ∅ for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and
⋃m
k=1Bk = N . We call each B ∈ B a component
and B(i) denotes the component that contains the player i ∈ N .
A finite sequence B := {B0, ...,Bh+1} of coalition structures Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h + 1, on N
is called a level structure (Winter, 1989) on N if Br is a refinement of Br+1 for each
r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, i. e. Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for all i ∈ N , B0 = {{i}: i ∈ N} and Bh+1 = {N}.
Br denotes the r-th level of B and Br(Bk) denotes the component of the r-th level that
contains the component Bk ∈ Bk, 0 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ h + 1. The set of all level structures with
player set N is denoted by LN. A triple (N, v,B) consisting of a TU-game (N, v) ∈ VN
and a level structure B ∈ LN is called an LS-game. The collection of all LS-games
on N is denoted by VLN. We note that each LS-game (N, v,B0) with a trivial level
structure B0 := {B0,B1} corresponds to a TU-game (N, v) and each LS-game (N, v,B1),
B1 := {B0,B1,B2}, corresponds to a game with coalition structure as introduced in Aumann
and Dre`ze (1974) and (Owen (1977). Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN and B = {B0, ...,Bh+1}:
• From a level structure onN follows a restricted level structure on T ∈ ΩN by eliminat-
ing the players in N\T . With coalition structures Br|T := {B∩T : B∈ Br, B∩T 6= ∅},
0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, the new level structure on T is given by B|T := {B0|T , ...,Bh+1|T} ∈ LT
and (T, v,B|T ) ∈ VLT is called the restriction of (N, v,B) to player set T .
• We define Br := {Br0, ...,Brh+1−r} ∈ LBr, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, as the induced r-th level
structure from B by considering the components B ∈ Br as players, where Brk :={{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ B′} : B′ ∈ Br+k}, 0 ≤ k ≤ h+ 1− r is a coalition structure such that
each component is a set of all components of the r-th level which are subsets of the same
component of the (r+k)-th level. The induced r-th level game
(Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr
is given by
vr(Q) := v(
⋃
B∈Q
B) for all Q ⊆ Br.1 (1)
• We define Br :=
{B0, ...,Br, {N}} ∈ LN, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, as the r-th cut level structure
from B if we cut out all levels between the r-th and the (h+ 1)-th level. (N, v,Br) is
called the r-th cut of (N, v,B). Note that we have for each B = {B0, ...,Bh+1} also
B = Bh.
A TU-value φ is an operator that assigns a payoff vector φ(N, v) ∈ RN to any (N, v) ∈
VN, an LS-value ϕ is an operator that assigns a payoff vector ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN to any
(N, v, B) ∈ VLN.
We define W:= {f : U→ R++} with wi := w(i) for all w ∈W and i ∈ U as the set of all
positive weight systems on the universe of all players and we define W2N := {f : 2N\∅ →
R++} with wS := w(S) for all w ∈ W2N, S ∈ ΩN, as the set of all positive weight systems
on all coalitions S ∈ ΩN.
The (simply) weighted Shapley values2 Shw (Shapley, 1953a) are defined by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N and w ∈W. (2)
The Shapley value Sh (Shapley, 1953b) distributes the dividends ∆v(S) equally among
all players of a coalition S and is a special case of a weighted Shapley value, given by
1In Owen (1977) we have the special case r = 1. There such a game is called as quotient game.
2We desist from possibly null weights as in Shapley (1953a) or Kalai and Samet (1987).
4Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN,B = Bh, T ∈ ΩN, T 3 i, and
KT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrT (i), where K
r
T (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}| .
The Shapley Levels value3 ShL (Winter, 1989) is defined by
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
Obvious coincides ShL with Sh if h = 0 and it is well-known that ShL coincides with the
Owen value (Owen, 1977) if h = 1.
We refer to the following axioms for LS-values which are adaptions of standard-axioms
for TU-values (with the exception of the last axiom):4
Efficiency, E. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Null player, N. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N a null player in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0.
Additivity, A. For all (N, v, B), (N, v′, B) ∈ VLN, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
Balanced group contributions, BGC (Calvo, Lasaga and Winter, 1996). For all
(N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N\B`, v,B|N\B`) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N\Bk, v,B|N\Bk).
This axiom states that for two components Bk, B` of the same level which belong to the
same component one level higher the contribution of B` to the total payoff of all players
from Bk equals the contribution of Bk to the total payoff of all players from B`.
Standardness, ST0. (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) For all (N, v) ∈ VN, N = {i, j}, i 6= j,
we have
ϕi(N, v) = v({i}) + 1
2
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
Standardness leads to sharing the surplus by cooperating in two player games that the sur-
plus is divided equally. The following axiom stands for dividing the surplus proportionally
to the weights of the players in two player games.
Weighted standardness, WS0. (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) For all (N, v) ∈ VN, N =
{i, j}, i 6= j, and w ∈W, we have
ϕi(N, v) = v({i}) + wi
wi + wj
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
The next axiom has the meaning that the sum of the payoffs to all players in a component
coincides with the payoff to this component if the component is regarded as a player in
an induced level game.
3This formula is presented in Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, eq. (1))
4In the case of using a subdomain, we require an axiom to hold when all games belong to this subdomain.
If there are used weights for some coalitions, these weights are still valid in the subdomain.
5Level game property, LG (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, B ∈
Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, we have ∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(Br, vr,Br).
3 Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values
Owen (1977) suggested for his value a two-step approach where the first step consists of
using the Shapley value on the quotient game. In the second stage the Shapley value
is applied to the result of the first step again. Vidal-Puga (2012) adapted the same
procedure for the value ζ, an extension of a weighted Shapley value to coalition structures
where the weights are given by the size of the coalitions. Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga
(2011) presented an extension to level structures and replaced the two-step approach by
a multi-step mechanism as suggested also in Owen (1977). It is still not known and there
is no hint in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) that their value can easily generalized
to an extension of the weighted Shapley values in general. The only problem is to know
how to deal with arbitrary exogenously given weights for coalitions. The substantial idea
behind our definition, similar suggested in Owen (1977) and implemented as an algorithm
in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) is as follows:
In a first step we distribute the worth of the grand coalition v(N) among the components
Bh of the h−th level as players using a weighted Shapley value. In the second step each
payoff to a component Bh from the first step is divided by a weighted Shapley value
among all components Bh−1 (the new players) which are subsets of the component Bh
and so on for all levels. In the last step we distribute the payoff to components B1 from
the first level among the original players i ∈ N . Therefore we need a weight system for
the coalitions. For notational parsimony we give the following notation.
Notation 3.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, i ∈ N and T ∈ ΩBk(i), 0 ≤ k ≤ h. We
denote by T ki := {B ∈ Bk : B ⊆ Bk+1(i), B 6= Bk(i)} ∪ {T} the set that contains all
components of the k-th level which are subsets of the component Bk+1(i) where component
Bk(i) is replaced by coalition T .
Definition 3.2. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, w ∈ W2N, i ∈ N and let for all k, 0 ≤
k ≤ h, T ∈ ΩBk(i), T ki the set from notation 3.1, wk,T ∈W a weight system with coalitions
S as players such that wk,TS := wS, wS ∈ w, for all S ∈ T ki , v¯h+1i := v and v¯ki given by
v¯ki (T ) := Sh
wk,T
T (T ki , v˜ki ) for all T ∈ ΩB
k(i) (3)
where v˜ki is specified by
v˜ki (Q) := v¯k+1i (
⋃
S∈Q
S) for all Q ⊆ T ki .
Then the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels value ShwHL is defined by
ShwHLi (N, v,B) := v¯0i ({i}) for all i ∈ N.
Remarks 3.3. ShwHL coincides with Shw if B = B0 and w{i} = wi for all i ∈ N . Since
Shw is efficient and additive, it is obvious, that ShwHL meets E, A and LG.
6Similar to Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996), who characterized the Shapley levels value
by efficiency and balanced group contributions, Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) char-
acterized their value by efficiency and balanced per capita contributions. This axiom
is a special case of the following one by limiting the weights to the size of the relevant
components.
Weighted balanced group contributions, WBGC5. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B =
Bh, w ∈ W2N, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N\B`, v,B|N\B`)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)−
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N\Bk, v,B|N\Bk)
wB`
.
In difference to BGC, here the contributions of one component to the players of the other
component and vice versa are proportional to the weights of the components.
Theorem 3.4. Let w ∈ W2N. ShwHL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E and WBGC.
Proof. It is clear that def. 3.2 is equivalent to the algorithm given in Go´mez-Ru´a and
Vidal-Puga (2011, section 3) if we use as weights the cardinality of the coalitions. Thus
the rest of the proof of theorem 3.4 is omitted because it’s only an exercise to adapt
the proofs of proposition 7 and theorem 8 in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011), using
weighted balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980; Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) for the
weighted Shapley values in proposition 7 and replacing the given weights (size of the
components) by arbitrary weights in theorem 8.
Remark 3.5. If all weights are equal, we use in fact in line (3) the Shapley value and
WBGC equals BGC. So, by Calvo, Lasaga and Winter (1996, Theorem 2), def. 3.2
determines in this case the Shapley levels value ShL.
Remark 3.6. As shown by example 1 in Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011), ShwHL
doesn’t satisfy N in general.
4 Level-consistency
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) introduced a reduced game of a TU -game.
Definition 4.1. Let (N, v) ∈ VN, R ∈ ΩN and φ a TU-value. The reduced game
(R, vφR) ∈ VR is given for all S ∈ ΩR by
vφR(S) := v
(
S ∪Rc)−∑
j∈Rc
φj
(
S ∪Rc, v) (4)
where Rc := N\R.
Remark 4.2. If φ is efficient eq. (4) can be simplified to
vφR(S) :=
∑
j∈S
φj
(
S ∪Rc, v).
5This axiom extends weighted balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980).
7The interpretation of a reduced game must be seen in context with a TU-value that must
have a special property. So Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) formulated the following axiom
to characterize the weighted Shapley values.
Consistency, C. For all (N, v) ∈ VN, R ∈ ΩN, we have φi(N, v) = φi(R, vφR) for all i ∈ R.
The meaning of this axiom is as follows: A coalition of players Rc leaves the game. In the
reduced game each coalition S that is a subset of the coalition R of the remaining players
obtains the worth of the old coalition S ∪ Rc less the payoff that the removed players
obtain in the restricted game played on S ∪ Rc. Then a TU-value is consistent if each
player in R obtains in the reduced and in the original game the same payoff. It turned
out that the weighted Shapley values have got an intense connection to this axiom.
Theorem 4.3. (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) Let w ∈ W. Shw is the unique TU-value
that satisfies C and WS 0.
If we exchange WS0 by ST0 this theorem characterizes the Shapley value. By adding
LG, Winter (1992) extended this axiomatization for the Shapley value to the Owen value
(see proof of theorem 3 in Winter (1992)). Similar Huettner (2015) transferred the related
axiomatization of Feldman (1999) and Ortmann (1999) for the proportional value to his
proportional value for coalition structures. Our new reduced game for level structures
extends the reduced game for TU-games in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) too but it is no
extension of the reduced game used in Winter (1992) and Huettner (2015) respectively.
Definition 4.4. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, R ∈ ΩN such that R =
⋃
B∈BhB and ϕ
an LS-value. The reduced level game (R, vϕR,B|R) ∈ VLR is given for all S ∈ ΩR by
vϕR(S) := v(S ∪Rc)−
∑
B∈Bh, B*R
ϕB
(Bh|S∪Rc , vh,Bh|S∪Rc) (5)
where Rc := N\R and (Bh|S∪Rc , vh,Bh|S∪Rc) is the induced h-th level game restricted to
S ∪Rc.
Remark 4.5. If B = B0, def. 4.4 coincides with def. 4.1.
Remark 4.6. If ϕ is efficient eq. (5) can be simplified to
vϕR(S) :=
∑
B∈Bh, B⊆R
ϕS∩B
(Bh|S∪Rc , vh,Bh|S∪Rc).
The following axiom extends C.
Level-consistency, LC. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, R =
⋃
B∈BhB, we have
ϕi(N, v, B) = ϕi(R, vϕR,B|R) for all i ∈ R. (6)
R is a coalition of all players of some components of the h-th level. All players of the other
components of the h-th level leave the game. In the reduced level game each coalition
S ∈ ΩR obtains the worth of the old coalition S ∪ Rc less the payoff that the removed
components obtain in the induced h-th level game restricted to S ∪Rc. Then an LS-value
is consistent if each player in R obtain in the reduced level game the same payoff as in
the original game.
Remark 4.7. If B = B0, LC coincides with C.
8We adapt WS0 to level structures.
Weighted standardness, WS. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN with B = B0, N = {i, j}, i 6=
j, and w ∈ W2N, we have
ϕi(N, v, B) = v({i}) + w{i}
w{i} + w{j}
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
To characterize the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values we need a very weak property
that states that if the h-th level consists only of one component we can remove this level
from the level structure without consequences.
Inessential (last) level property, IL. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, h ≥ 1, and
Bh = Bh+1 we have ϕ(N, v, B) = ϕ(N, v, Bh−1).
The last three properties fit best with the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values:
Theorem 4.8. Let w ∈ W2N. ShwHL satisfies IL, WS and LC.
Proof. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh and w ∈ W2N:
• IL: If Bh = Bh+1, we have in notation 3.1 for all i ∈ N and T ∈ ΩBh(i), T hi = {T}. It
follows in line (3), v¯hi (T ) = Sh
wh,T
T ({T}, v˜hi ) = v(T ) for all T ∈ ΩBh(i). Thus, if h ≥ 1,
there has been no change in line (3) for all k, 0 ≤ k ≤ h− 1, if we drop the h-th level
and IL is shown.
• WS: By def. (3.2) and line (2), the claim is obvious.
• LC: Let i ∈ N, R = ⋃B∈BhB, R ⊇ Bh(i). By IL, it is sufficient to show LC on level
structures Bh with Bh 6= Bh+1. If R = N or |N | = 1, eq. (6) is trivially satisfied.
Let now |N | ≥ 2 and R 6= N . By Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), Shw satisfies C for all
w ∈W. For each T ∈ ΩBh(i) we have a set T hi from notation 3.1 and a related T hi |R on
the restricted level structure B|R. Thus follows by eq. (3) for k = h
v¯hi (T ) = Sh
wh,T
T (T hi , v˜hi ) =
C,
rem. 4.5
Shw
h,T
T
(T hi |R, (v˜ϕR)hi ) (7)
where (v˜ϕR)
h
i is given by (v˜
ϕ
R)
h
i (Q) := vϕR(
⋃
S∈Q S) for all Q ⊆ T hi |R. Thus there is no
difference in eq. (3) between both games for all k 6= h too and LC is shown.
It transpires that the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values are characterized by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.9. Let w ∈ W2N. ShwHL is the unique TU-value that satisfies IL, WS and
LC.
Proof. By theorem 4.8, it is sufficient to show uniqueness. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B =
Bh, w ∈ W2N, i ∈ N arbitrary and ϕ an LS-values that satisfies IL, WS and LC. By LC,
we have
ϕj(N, v, B) = ϕj(Bh(i), vϕBh(i),B|Bh(i)) for all j ∈ Bh(i)
where vϕBh(i) is unique by WS, LC, rem. 4.7, rem. 4.5 and theorem 4.3.
9By IL, we have for each restricted k-th cut level structure Bk|Bk(i), k > 0, from B on
Bk(i),
ϕ(Bk(i), vˆϕBk(i), Bk|Bk(i)) = ϕ(Bk(i), vˆϕBk(i), Bk−1|Bk(i))
where vˆϕBk(i) is recursive defined by
vˆϕBk(i) :=
{
vϕBh(i) if k = h,(
vˆϕBk+1(i)
)ϕ
Bk(i) else.
Hence, by an induction on the levels k, IL and LC, it follows that
ϕj(N, v, B) = ϕj(B1(i), vˆϕB1(i),B0|B1(i)) for all j ∈ B1(i)
where vˆϕB1(i) is unique by WS, LC, rem. 4.7, rem. 4.5 and theorem 4.3. Therefore, by WS,
LC, rem. 4.7, rem. 4.5 and theorem 4.3, ϕ is well defined and the proof is completed.
To introduce a new axiomatization of the Shapley levels value we adapt ST0.
Standardness, ST. For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN with B = B0 and N = {i, j}, i 6= j, we
have
ϕi(N, v, B) = v({i}) + 1
2
[
v({i, j})− v({i})− v({j})].
Since ST is a special case of WS, we obtain the following corollary by theorem 4.9.
Corollary 4.10. ShL is the unique TU-value that satisfies IL, ST and LC.
Remark 4.11. The axioms in theorem 4.9 are logically independent.
Proof. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh and w ∈ W2N:
• IL: The LS-value ϕ defined by
ϕ :=
{
1
2
ShwHL, if h ≥ 1,
ShwHL, else,
satisfies WS and LC but not IL.
• WS: Let v ∈ VN, v(S) > 0 for all S ∈ ΩN, and B = B1. If we regard the propor-
tional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure in Huettner (2015) in
the notation for a level structure with B = B1, this value satisfies IL and LC but not
WS.
• LC: The LS-value ϕ defined by ϕ(N, v, B) := Shw(N, v) with wi := w{i} for all i ∈ N
satisfies IL and WS but not LC.
5 Conclusion
It would seem reasonable in our view to use weights if operating players are in some sense
not symmetric, e. g., if some players have not the same political, financial or military
power, contribute more to the result and so on. Often players act not as lone fighters.
They join forces and small groups form together larger groups and so on. So the weighted
Shapley hierarchy levels values meet with the multi-stage mechanism a widespread idea
how a hierarchical value has to operate.
10
That these values don’t satisfy the null player property is not necessary a disadvantage.
A null player receives a compensation since she supports in an acting coalition the other
members with her contribution to the weight of the coalition. So a null player is only a null
in the coalition function and not necessary in the weight system for coalitions. For further
information on this area see also Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2010) and Go´mez-Ru´a and
Vidal-Puga (2011).
An emphasis of this paper is on consistency. Consistency plays an important role in
many allocation concepts in cooperative game theory. The differences in the numerous
varieties of the reduced games are decisive for the diversity of the different consistency
characteristics. So the reduced level game is no extension of the reduced game in Winter
(1992). There the original players of the game determine the worths in the coalition
function of the reduced game. In the reduced level game the acting coalitions are decisive
for the worths of the coalitions. If we have a trivial level structure the reduced level game
coincides with the reduced game, suggested in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), too.
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